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Dharmakirti on the Duality of the Object: Pramanavarttika III (Leipziger Studien zu Kultur und Geschichte Sud- und Zentralasiens) [Eli Franco, Miyako. : Dharmakirti’s Pramanavarttika: An Annotated Translation of the Fourth Chapter (Parathanumana): 1 (Veroffentlichungen Zu Den Sprachen Und. Japan’s largest platform for academic e-journals: J-STAGE is a full text database for reviewed academic papers published by Japanese societies.

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There are two faults: This initial reference-fixing pramznavarttika then preserved in a commonly respected convention that transmits the original intention and dubbing from speaker to speaker. We have preferred, instead, to compose a detailed analytical table of contents. The Epistemologists’ version of dharma s would be no exception in that respect of being particulars rather than universals. Thus this is analogous. Thus, the classic illustration of this form is “Whatever is produced is impermanent, like a vase.

Dharmakieti result is that for Dharmaklrti any word isfitfor any object. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 32, 1, Publications de l’lnstitut Orientaliste de Louvain For a usual Tibetan classification see Yons ‘dzin rtags rigs, p.

In short, principle II seems to be considerably stronger than principle I. This matter has been taken up elsewhere: The dharma alone is what is to be proved in this [dharmin]. He saw this undesirable consequence as one of the main challenges to logical thought, i. Cox, Collett,Disputed Dharmas. And there is no other [type of] nondeviant [reason]. We will now turn to Dharmaklrti’s treatment of prasiddha, viz.



Following Bu ston’s commentary on PVin, the opponent here is a Mimamsaka. As in the case of Hume, this too is an observation of regularities and would seem to be fallible, subject to exceptions.

Even when [the connection] is not made in the world, there is nothing obstructing it because the complex [of causal conditions] is complete Trans, of PV I, k.

Although the intention might not be [explicitly] stated, it would be understood from the context of the discussion prakarana. Thus, peamanavarttika a specific fitness is not acknowledged now e. Thus there would be nothing but reciprocal contradiction. PVBh above “Suppose the two [types of] objects taught in the treatise—viz.

Dharmakīrti (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

But if it were prohibited because that entity [constituting the ground] was not there, then there would be no fault even if there were prohibition in the case of sasin. To quote Devendrabuddhi’s explanation of the commentator’s views: The Pramanavarttika was very influential among Buddhist philosophers such as Jnanagarbha, Santaraksita and Kamalasila for whom it became a key work on epistemology. Hence, in the sadvitiyaprayoga, if we established that the vase was the “companion,” ipso facto it would be proven that the person is not.

See also PVVIn what seems to be at least partially a top-down approach, Mark Siderits has taken the relevant double negation as involving two different types of negation, choice and exclusion, so that it is the combination of the two that picks out a class of individuals, all the while staying nominalistically unengaged to universals Siderits ; Why would that which is superimposed by words not be a [valid] reason?


For, it is when simple impermanence is refuted that there is a fault. It would be correct for it to be a [valid] reason. In short, good reasons involve formal considerations what follows from what?

There are no connections between qualities and quality-possessors which are due to [real] entities, but rather they only concern words. After all, the permanent thing would be present unchanged both when the new effects are present and when they are absent. The statement of the conclusion, A is Bis omitted.

Taking into account the commentarial explanations on k.

Pramanavarttika – Wikipedia

The [thesis] ‘Everything said is false’ is just like the Vaisesika who says that sound is permanent. PV-k IMlY.

To bring out the problem, take the following tempting, but invalid, inference: How then can you say that all are connected [to all]? The work is a commentary on an earlier work by the Buddhist logician Dignagathe Pramanasamuccaya. However, it also leads to a larger matter.

We have treated of the epistemological school’s position on scriptural authority in some detail elsewhere. The problem of asrayasiddha is taken up in various Buddhist contexts: Above all, we will need a reliable edition of the dharmakifti, using new material.

PVV’s introduction to k.